Getting the fly out of the bottle
by: Rev. Fr. Ranhilio Aquino
When is a child conceived? That question has figured prominently, of late, in the debate over the Reproductive Health Law, triggered, no doubt, by the questions raised by the members of the Supreme Court at the oral argument on the consolidated petitions against the implementation of the law. Why it is that the debate has once more been drawn to the conundrum of when human life begins, I cannot fully explain. Flashing an “originalist” card — that theory that the Constitution is rightly interpreted by recourse to the “original intent” of its framers — it seems that some petitioners had argued that the Constitution obliged the State to protect life from its conception. They apparently proffered to the High Court the explanation of some members of the ConCom that what was meant was “from the moment of fertilization”. Amazingly, some justices took the bait and attempted a limp parry: The proffered opinion, they said, was not that of the Commission as a whole but of a minority of its members! Of course, that exchange only highlights the problem with an “originalist” approach to constitutional interpretation. When does human life begin? That is a question that has continued to beguile and vex philosophers and jurists — when the latter are thoughtful enough to philosophize. It has gone by many names. At some time in the past, it was dealt with as the problem of hominization: that moment when God infused the rational, immortal soul and transformed the body into a human body. But of course, the problem with such a theory becomes almost immediately apparent: 40 days can so easily be 60 days, and the latter, roll over into the third trimester, and soon it is clear that one is setting an artificial, arbitrary threshold.
by: Rev. Fr. Ranhilio Aquino
When is a child conceived? That question has figured prominently, of late, in the debate over the Reproductive Health Law, triggered, no doubt, by the questions raised by the members of the Supreme Court at the oral argument on the consolidated petitions against the implementation of the law. Why it is that the debate has once more been drawn to the conundrum of when human life begins, I cannot fully explain. Flashing an “originalist” card — that theory that the Constitution is rightly interpreted by recourse to the “original intent” of its framers — it seems that some petitioners had argued that the Constitution obliged the State to protect life from its conception. They apparently proffered to the High Court the explanation of some members of the ConCom that what was meant was “from the moment of fertilization”. Amazingly, some justices took the bait and attempted a limp parry: The proffered opinion, they said, was not that of the Commission as a whole but of a minority of its members! Of course, that exchange only highlights the problem with an “originalist” approach to constitutional interpretation. When does human life begin? That is a question that has continued to beguile and vex philosophers and jurists — when the latter are thoughtful enough to philosophize. It has gone by many names. At some time in the past, it was dealt with as the problem of hominization: that moment when God infused the rational, immortal soul and transformed the body into a human body. But of course, the problem with such a theory becomes almost immediately apparent: 40 days can so easily be 60 days, and the latter, roll over into the third trimester, and soon it is clear that one is setting an artificial, arbitrary threshold.